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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UTAH PIPE LINE COMPANY, a Cor-
poration, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, W. R. 
McENTIRE and STEW ART M. 
HANSON, Commissioners of the Pub-
lic Service Commission of Utah, and 
UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Respondents. j 
; 
Case No. 
7695 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UTAH 
NATURAL GAS COMPANY 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
On the 29th day of May, 1950, Respondent Utah Nat-
ural Gas Company, a Delaware corporation, qualified to 
do business in Utah, made application to the Public Ser-
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vice Commission of Utah for a certificate of convenience 
and necessity authorizing it to transport and supply natural 
gas from. gas fields in Southeastern Utah, primarily at 
Boundary Butte and Monticello, to the industrial area in 
and around Salt Lake City (R. 1106-1110). On November 
17, 1950, this Respondent amended its original application 
and requested a certificate to build its line along the route 
proposed in its original application and also to construct 
a supplmentary line from Last Chance to Salina, connect-
ing with the main line at Fountain Green. It was proposed 
that this supplementary line would serve an area in the 
Sevier Valley and that the interconnected line would serve 
the industrial area from Provo north to Salt Lake City 
(R. 1111-1117). 
The hearing on the amended application was set for 
the 11th of December, 1950. Five days prior to that date 
the Utah Pipe Line Company, Appellant herein, was or-
ganized as a Delaware corporation. On December 9th it 
was authorized to do business in the State of Utah and, 
two days later, on the date of the hearing, appeared before 
the Public Service Commission of Utah and requested leave 
to intervene and introduce evidence on behalf of its appli-
cation. This request was refused but the Commission did 
permit Appellant to intervene for the limited purpose of 
objecting to the application of the Utah Natural Gas Com-
pany (R. 10-13). Parenthetically, it is interesting to spec-
ulate on what Appellant would have done had it been per-
mitted to intervene as a competing applicant. As a two 
day old corporation without an acre of committed or even 
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prospective gas in the State of Utah and without any au-
thority or certificate from the Federal Power Commission 
to bring claimed New Mexico gas across two state lines 
how could Appellant have made even a semblence of a show-
ing? 
Both Appellant and the Utah Natural Gas Company, 
at the time of the hearing before the Utah Public Service 
Commission, were skeleton corporations. Both were spon-
sored by other interests to perform the express. function 
of transporting and marketing natural gas. The Respond-
ent company was sponsored by Byrd-Frost, Inc., of Dallas, 
Paul B. English, The Three States Natural Gas Company, 
and others. The Appellant company was sponsored solely 
by the Delhi Oil Corporation. All these sponsors are petrol-
eum producers not engaged in the transporting and mar-
keting of petroleum products. 
After conducting prolonged hearings in 1950, which 
hearings were continued to January and conducted through 
a part of February in 1951, the Commission took the mat-
ter under advisement and on the 12th day of March, 1951, 
signed an order granting to this Respondent a certificate 
conditioned that, within one year of the effective date of 
said order, it should: 
"{a) File with this Commission the uncondi-
tional commitment of a financial house of recog-
nized responsibility, committing itself to supply the 
funds necessary to the construction of the pipe line 
and facilities to be installed by Utah Natural Gas 
Company; 
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" (b) Concurrently with the furnishing of such 
commitment and as a part thereof, Utah Natural 
Gas Company shall file with this Commission the 
certificate of an independent geologist of recognized 
professional standing acceptable to this Commission 
that there are proven gas reserves committed to 
Utah Natural Gas Company adequate to justify the 
construction of the line and facilities. 
"(c) Deposit with this Commission copies of 
any gas purchase contracts entered into with owners 
of producing gas wells. 
"(d) Deposit with this Commission a copy or 
copies of its contracts. then entered into with a rec-
ognized responsible construction firm or firms for 
the construction of said line and facilities; and 
" (e) Pending the compliance with the condi-
tions herein imposed, Utah Natural Gas Company 
shall make no public offering of its stock or other 
securities" (R. 1173). 
From this conditional order the Appellant company 
petitioned for a rehearing. On the 16th day of April, 1951, 
this petition was denied (R. 1182). On May 11, 1951, 
Appellant filed in this Court its petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari (R. 1184-1192). Appellant is the only one of all the 
protestants who has appealed from the Commission's order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We feel that the Appellant in presenting its statement 
of facts to this Court at pages 3-22 of its brief has ignored 
many important phases of the presentation made before 
the Commission. Therefore, we propose to outline briefly 
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a more comprehensive statement of facts so that this Court 
may have a better understanding of this Respondent's 
position and its reasons for seeking the conditional certifi-
cate granted. 
Respondent company's evidence falls into four categor-
ies. First, public need; second, availability of natural gas 
in the vicinity of the proposed pipe line; third, feasibility 
of the engineering plan; and fourth, feasibility of the 
financial plan. 
1. Public Need-There is very little point in setting 
out testimony of the public witnesses who appeared and 
testified to the great need in the Salt Lake industrial area 
of natural gas. The record shows that the southeastern 
and central portions of the state are without any present 
supply. The record also amply shows that industrial de-
velopment, domestic convenience and the building of new 
homes is greatly retarded because of either no natural gas 
or an insufficient supply. This fact is conceded by App~l­
lant and is its reason for seeking a certificate of its own. 
2. Availability of Natural Gas in the Vicinity of the 
Proposed Line-This evidence consists of testimony of seven 
trained geologists who are presently actively engaged in 
exploratory and development work in the central and south-
eastern portion of the state. They are Kenneth M. Willson, 
Dorsey Hager, Glen Ruby, Paul Walton, R. E. Landon, D. 
H. Byrd and Jack Frost. 
Mr. Willson, who is an independent consulting geolo-
gist and who has been.employed for the past several years 
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by Byrd-Frost, Inc., working in the Four Corners area, tes-
tified from a carefully prepared report of the known gas 
reserves, the probable gas reserves and the general gas 
potential of the entire southeastern and central area of 
the state. His report was especially significant because 
of the great amount of work done by him in the general 
area, during the past few years. His recommendations 
have resulted in the drilling of thirty-five producing oil 
and gas wells and only eight dry holes ( R. 55) . 
After generally discussing the area in the vicinity of 
the pipe line and explaining to the Commission his reasons 
for believing that there is an ample supply of gas to justify 
the construction of the proposed line the witness specifi-
cally discussed three structures which he believed would 
produce a sufficient quantity of commercial gas to supply 
the line over a twenty year period. These structures are 
Boundary Butte, Monticello, and Last Chance. In explain-
ing the reserves in the foregoing structures the witness 
repeatedly emphasized that he had kept his estimates con-
servative so that any error would be on the safe side. He 
also pointed out that Mr. Joseph Gordon, a petroleum geolo-
gist, collaborated with him in computing the reserve on 
the data which he supplied (Exhibit 28-34, R. 1067-1073). 
Boundary Butte, he explained, was a known producer 
of nat~ral gas. It had not been developed because there 
is not a line to take the gas to market. This structure, he 
estimated, contains 348 billion cubic feet of recoverable 
natural gas (R. 70). Because, however, the Boundary Butte 
gas does not have the required b. t. u. content it will be 
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necessary to process it and remove inert materials. As a 
result the witness estimated that the Boundary Butte struc-
ture can produce approximately 255 billion cubic feet of 
648 b. t. u. gas (R. 73). It was explained .by subsequent 
expert witnesses that this 648 b. t. u. gas would be "sweet-
ened" with other gas and raised to the desired 875 b. t. u. 
content \vhich is the b. t. u. content of the gas to be sold. 
In collaboration with Mr. Gordon, Mr. Willson com-
puted the reserves at Last Chance to be 104 billion cubic 
feet of recoverable gas in place reduced to 98 billion cubic 
feet of deliverable 875 b. t. u. gas (R. 83). Mr. Dorsey 
Hager, called by Respondent, also testified to the reserves 
at Last Chance. He thought Mr. Willson's estimates were 
too conservative and estimated that in his opinion there 
were 164 billion cubic feet in the Last Chance structure. 
In making the estimate he employed the same volumetric 
method employed by Willson and Gordon. His larger esti-
mate was due to a difference in basic data. He thought 
there was more acreage in the Last Chance structure than 
Willson had estimated (R. 224-225). 
In estimating the reserves at Monticello Mr. Willson 
pointed out that the structure, unlike Boundary Butte and 
Last Chance, could· not be considered proved so that ac-
curate appraisals of the reserves could be made. Before 
the structure could be classed as proved more exploratory 
and development work would be necessary. He was certain, 
however, that the large structure which lies east of Mon-
ticello contains tremendous quantities of commercial gas 
which can be made available to the proposed pipe line if 
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an adequate development and exploratory program is 
launched. His reasons for believing that Monticello con-
tains gas were: (1) It is adjacent to the proven reserves 
in the Dove Creek structure which lies to the east in Colo-
rado and is separated from that structure by a small 
syncline. (2) The subsurface formations at Dove Creek 
corrolate with the subsurface formations at Monticello. 
( 3) The No. 1 Redd Well which was drilled at Monticello 
found 1100 b. t. u. gas in the same formation and at ap-
proximately the same depth that 1100 b. t. u. gas was 
found at Dove Creek. (4) The failure of the No. 1 Redd 
Well to produce commercial quantities of natural gas was 
due to a mechanical and not a structural failure (R. 92). 
By employing very conservative estimates on the Mon-
ticello structure Mr. Willson and Mr. Gordon computed 
682 billion cubic feet of natural gas in place at Monticello 
and stated that 457 billion cubic feet of this gas, with a 
b. t. u. content of 875 or better, could be placed in the 
proposed line over a twenty year period ( R. 97) . 
Relying only on the structures at Boundary Butte, Last 
Chance and Monticello, Mr. Gordon and Mr. Willson com-
puted, as shown in Exhibit 34, a total of 1 trillion, 134 
billion cubic feet of recoverable reserves in the three struc-
tures and stated that from these recoverable reserves they 
could withdraw over a twenty year period 816 billion cubic 
feet of exc-ellent, high b. t. u. gas ( R. 1073) . 
While Mr. Willson confined his estimates of rese·rves 
to the three structures nam·ed, he further testified that 
on his recommendation his client, Byrd-Frost, Inc., had 
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acquired large holdings of acreage in southeastern Utah 
in more than t'venty other structures and that in the event 
a certificate should be granted to the Utah Natural Gas 
Company he would recommend the immediate drilling of 
many of these structures and extensive drilling and de-
veloping of the structures at Boundary Butte, Last Chance 
and Monticello (R. 103). He had no question in his mind 
that if a pipe line should be constructed as proposed that 
there would be more than an ample supply of gas to fill 
it (R. 140). 
The other geologists corroborated and supplemented the 
report of lVIr. \iVillson. Dr. Paul T. Walton confined his 
attention to the Upper Schofield area which is located west 
of Price and adjacent to the proposed line. This area was 
referred to by Mr. Willson. Walton stated that there was 
an excellent possibility of finding large reserves of com-
mercial gas in the huge structures located in the area known 
as Gordon Creek, Clear Creek, North Schofield, Flat Can-
yon and Joes Valley. He based his opinion on the follow-
ing: (1) The well which was drilled on his recommenda-
tion by the Pacific vVestern at Gordon Creek encountered 
inflammable gas in unknown quantities in the Dakota 
Sandstone and, according to the log of the well, showed 
some indications of gas in the Ferron, Morrison and Emery 
sands. The well was not tested properly for gas because 
its primary objective was oil and because it was. finally 
completed as a commercial carbon dioxide well. Further-
more, gas is worthless unless there is a pipe line in the 
vicinity. (2) The drilling of this well proved that the fault-
ing in the area. had not destroyed the trap in the under-
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lying structure. ( 3) The area is strategically located be-
tween the Uintah and Paradox Basins and contains for-
mations which are known to contain petroleum products 
in Wyoming, New Mexico, Colorado and Utah. While this 
area cannot be, of course, considered as a proved area, it 
gives excellent promise as a potential producer of inflam-
mable gas and, Dr. Walton testified, if the certificate is 
granted and a pipe line constructed he would recommend 
an immediate exploratory drilling of all five of these struc-
tures. 
He further explained that in the event gas is found 
in the Upper Schofield area it will be in tremendous quan-
tities because of the hugeness of the structures. Depend-
ing upon how many formations, if any, would yield com-
mercial gas the witness estimated the following possible 
reserves: Flat Canyon, 105 to 400 billion cubic feet; Clear 
Creek, 307 billion to 1 trillion cubic feet; North Schofield, 
63 billion to 200 billion cubic feet; J oes Valley, 576 billion 
to 2 trillion cubic feet. No estimate was made of the pos-
sible reserves at Gordon Creek (R. 202, 209, 211, 217). 
The estimates made by Mr. Walton were in no way 
relied upon by this Respondent and were produced for the 
Commission's consideration only to show the great poten-
tial of the ar~.a, and to point out the need for a gas line 
in the vicinity to stimulate further exploration and de-
velopment. 
Mr. Glen Ruby, who had been employed by the govern-
ments of Portugal, China, Chile, Argentina, and Cuba, and 
who was then employed by the United States government 
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in exploratory 'York on the Navy petroleun1 reserve in 
Alaska, testified that in his opinion the Colorado River basin 
area along the course of the proposed line in Southeastern 
Utah offers the best oil and gas future of any other un-
developed area in the United States (R. 172-175, 186). 
rvir. Ruby paid particular attention to the area around 
the Big Flat structure which is located near the town of 
Moab. The Big Flat, he explained, is located in the center 
of the Paradox Basin where the subsurface formations have 
reached a maximum thickness. The well which was drilled 
at the Big Flat by Tidewater indicated the presence of gas 
and oil, but because of low pressure in the area these 
products were effectively mudded off by the mud used in 
the rotary drill process (R. 184-187). Mr. Ruby and his 
associates propose to drill a well in this structure with a 
cable tool rig and expect excellent possibilities of obtaining 
large quantities of commercial gas. Such gas, if found, 
will go either to the California or the Utah market de-
pending on which way the first pipe line is constructed (R. 
189). 
Mr. Robert E. Landon, who is in charge of the geo-
physical work of General Petroleum in Idaho, Utah, Ari-
zona, Nevada, and Southeastern Colorado, indicated to the 
Commission that his company is actively interested in the 
construction of the proposed pipe line in Southeastern Utah 
because of its activity in that area where it is presently 
drilling for petroleum products and where it hopes to have 
a means of transporting gas to market in the event the 
same is found in commercial quantities (R. 313-315). 
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Both Mr. Byrd and Mr. Frost, who are partners in 
Byrd-Frost, Inc., and who are geologists, testified that they 
had in the past backed up the recommendations of their 
geologists, particularly Mr. Willson, and as a result had 
obtained large holdings of acreage in twenty some odd 
structures in the State of Utah. They expressed a willing-
ness to spend 5 to 10 million dollars drilling and developing 
these structures if the Commission granted the application 
for a certificate (R. 912, 920, 940). The attorneys for the 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company raised some question rela-
tive to the ability of Byrd-Frost, Inc., to undertake such a 
large scale program. At the Commission's request Mr. 
Byrd produced a financial statement showing that Byrd-
Frost, Inc., had a net worth in excess of 32 million dollars 
(R. 726, 1099). 
John R. Fell, a general partner in the banking house 
of Lehman Bros. in New York City, was asked the follow-
ing question and gave the following answer: Question. 
"Have you any opinion as an investment banker as to 
whether Byrd-Frost have got the ability to do that testing 
job?" Answer. "Well, I wish I was in as good position 
as they are to do it. There is no question in my mind that 
they have got the ability to do it" (R. 450). The record 
shows that Mr. Byrd and Mr. Frost, operating as Byrd-
Frost, Inc., presently own and operate more than 500 pro-
ducing oil and gas wells in the United States (R. 911). 
There was also some suggestion made that the plan 
proposed by the Applicant and supported by Byrd-Frost, 
Inc., was a promotion scheme and that Byrd-Frost, Inc., 
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would make a public offering of stock. In answer to this 
suggestion the two partners testified that they have never 
sold stock for any enterprise in which they have been in-
terested and that they do not anticipate selling stock for 
the drilling and development of gas in U tab ( R. 910) . 
It appears from Exhibits 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, and 
54 that this Respondent has a call on all the gas to be pro-
duced by Byrd-Frost, Inc., Paul B. English, Four Corners 
Oil Company, Morgan-Walton Oil Company, Last Chance 
Holding Company, Americol Petroleum Company and Cane 
Creek Oil Company. It also appears that Shell Oil Com-
pany and General Petroleum Company are willing and 
anxious to make arrangements for the sale of any gas they 
may obtain in the area to the Respondent company (R. 1085, 
1086, 1087, 1088, 1089, 1090, and 1093). All of the parties 
named own acreage in Southeastern and central Utah. For 
this reason all who were asked testified that they were 
anxious that the proposed intrastate line be constructed so 
that they would have a market for Utah produced gas, and 
all indicated that the construction of such a line would 
stimulate development. 
Appellant called two expert witnesses, Mr. Dougherty 
and Mr. Davis. Mr. Dougherty had never been on the Last 
Chance property and had not been on the Boundary Butte 
or Monticello property for at least eight years, during 
which time all of the existing wells on those structures had 
been drilled (R. 683). Mr. Davis had not at any time been 
on any of the structures identified by this Respondent. 
Neither had actively participated in the discovery of any 
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oil or gas well (R. 709). Nevertheless, they disagreed with 
some of the testimony given by the seven geologists. who 
testified for this Respondent. 
3. Feasibility and tke Engineering Plan--The engi-
neering of the proposed project falls into two logical cate-
gories: (a) Transporting, treating and processing of the 
natural gas; (b) construction of the proposed line. 
(a) Transporting, Treating, and Processing of the 
Natural Gas-Mr. Melvin Gertz, a qualified technical petrol-
eum engineer and an associate of Robert L. Purvin, con-
sulting engineers of Dallas, testified to a detailed study 
made by himself and his associates of the proposed opera-
tion of the line. His study is outlined in Exhibits 43 and 
44 (R. 1082-1083). His testimony dealt in detail with the 
analysis, processing, mixing and transporting of gas from 
Boundary Butte, Monticello and Last Chance through the 
pipe line to the distributing facilities enroute and to the 
Provo-Salt Lake industrial area (R. 317). His analysis and 
study, which is technical and detailed in nature, was not 
questioned by any of the protestants or by Appellant. 
(b) Construction of the Proposed Line-The location 
of the proposed route and the study relating to the costs of 
the proposed line and the details relative to the actual con-
struction were supplied by Mr. H. H. Allen and Mr. Joseph 
C. Gordon, both civil engineers from Dallas, Texas. From 
first hand experience and as. a result of studies which they 
had made they testified that the proposed line was feasible 
and that its total cost, including all the necessary facilities, 
would approximate, before adding overhead and interest, 
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$29,064,920.00 The technical aspects of this testimony were 
broken down into a detailed study which is set out in Ex-
hibit 42 at page 1081 of the record. The estimates made 
by Mr. Allen and Mr. Gordon were not questioned. 
-1. Feasibn.ity of the Financial Plan-Mr. William 
Merten, a certified public accountant and a partner of the 
firm of Merten, Smyer & Kernaghan, Dallas, Texas, testi-
fied that he had been employed by the Utah Natural Gas 
Company. to make a financial study and report for the 
proposed pipe line venture. He obtained his estimated cost 
of facilities, supplies, and operation from Mr. H. H. Allen 
and Mr. J. C. Gordon. Based on a supply of 100,000 cubic 
feet of gas per day selling at an industrial price of 23o/4 
cents and a gate price to retailers of 30 cents and projecting 
the performance over a twenty year period he formulated 
the financial plan set out in this Respondent's. Exhibit 42 
(R. 1081). He computed that the over all estimate cost 
would be a little less than $32,000,000.00. This financial 
plan had been submitted to Lehman Bros. Banking House 
of New York City. Two representatives of that hous.e, Mr. 
John R. Fell, a partner, and Mr. R. Raymond Rusmisel, 
explained that they had been consulted and had made a 
study of the venture and desired to undertake its complete 
financing providing ( 1) that the Commission would issue 
a certificate of convenience and necessity; {2) that their 
independent geologists, after such certificate had been 
granted, approved the estimates of Applicant's geologists 
and determined that the reserves were sufficient to justify 
the expenditure of $32,000,000.00. They testified that more 
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than a preliminary investigation had been made and that 
Lehman Bros. had concluded that the project in its funda-
mental nature was feasible (R. 444). 
Both Mr. Fell and Mr. Rusmisel indicated the finan-
cial proposals at the present stage of the proceedings were 
contingent and necessarily preliminary because of the ne-
cessity of doing further development work and of obtain-
ing a certificate of convenience and necessity. 
In summary, then, these facts appear: There is an 
unsupplied demand for natural gas in the central industrial 
area of Utah, .. adequate to justify the construction of the 
line proposed by the Respondent. The construction of such 
a line is feasible from the standpoint of economics, engi-
neering and finance. Responsible financing for the line 
is available upon the proof of adequate gas reserves. Com-
petent geologists produced by this Respondent estimate the 
gas reserves to be adequate; the Appellant's geologists con-
tend to the contrary. The proof of reserves can only be 
determined by extensive drilling. Such drilling will re-
quire the expenditure of several million dollars. Gas, un· 
like oil, can only move to market by pipe line. Those in 
control of the gas structures relied upon for supply will 
not risk their money on the necessary exploration without 
assurance that if and when the gas is brought above ground 
a pipe line in the hands of friendly interests will be avail-
able to take it to market; in short, that the Respondent, 
Utah Natural Gas Company, have a certificate of conven-
ience and necessity for the construction and operation of 
the proposed line. 
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Upon these facts this Respondent voluntarily pro-
posed as a reasonable and appropriate solution of the prob-
lems presented in this proceeding that the Commission 
grant to Utah Natural Gas Company the certificate of con-
venience and necessity prayed for by it, but impose con-
dition upon the exercise of such right ( R. 1004) . This the 
Commission did. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE WAS 
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION AND POWER 
OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
POINT II. 
THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE IS REA-
SONABLE AND IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST. 
POINT III. 
THE APPELLANT IS NOT A PARTY AG-
GRIEVED BY THE ORDER HEREIN AP-
PEALED FROM. 
POINT IV. 
THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE BY THE 
COMMISSION· DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE 
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PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL OR 
ST'ATE CONSTITUTION AND DOES NOT CON-
STITUTE AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF 
POWER T·O AN UNNAMED GEOLOGIST AND 
DOES NOT PERMIT A FINDING ON A MA-
TERIAL FACT BASED SOLELY ON HEAR-
SAY EVIDENCE. 
POINT V. 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURAL RE-
SOURCES OF THE STATE IS DESIRABLE IS 
A PROPER FINDING AND IS NOT ONE 
WHICH INDICATES A FAILURE TO REGU-
LARLY PURSUE ITS STATUTORY AUTHOR-
ITY. 
POINT VI. 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT EXCEED ITS 
LAWFUL AUTHORITY IN HEARING THE AP-
PLICATION OF THE UTAH NATURAL GAS 
COMPANY BEFORE IT HEARD THE APPLI-
CATION O·F APPELLANT. 
POINT VII. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
. UTAH DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY AND 
CAPRICIOUSLY IN NOT HAVING A FU.LL 
JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE FEDERAL 
POWER COMMISSION BEF.ORE RULING ON 
RESPONDENT·'S APPLICATION. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE WAS 
\VITHIN THE JURISDICTION AND POWER 
OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Section 76-4-1, Utah c·ode Annotated 1943, provides 
as follows: 
"The commission is hereby vested with power 
and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every 
public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the 
business of every such public utility in this state, and 
to do all things, whether herein specifically desig-
nated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or 
convenient in the exercise of such power and juris-
diction." (Italics ours.) 
Section 76-4-24, Utah Code Annotated 1943, deals spe-
cifically with the general subject of certificates of conven-
ience and necessity. The pertinent parts of that statute are 
as follows: 
" ( 3) Every applicant for such a certificate 
shall file in the office of the commission such evi-
dence as shall be required by the commission to show 
that such applicant has received the required con-
sent, franchise or permit of the proper county, city, 
municipal or other public authority. The commis-
sion shall have power, after a hearing, to issue said 
certificate as prayed for or to refuse to issue the 
same, or to issue it for the construction of a portion 
only of the contemplated railroad, street railroad, 
aerial bucket tramway, line, plant or syste·m, or ex-
tension thereof, or for the partial exercise only of 
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said right or privilege and may attach to the exer-
cise of the rights granted by said certificate such 
terms and conditions as in its judgment public con-
venience and necessity may require." (Italics ours.) 
It thus appears clearly that the legislature has dele-
gated to the Public Service Commission alone the right 
to impose in its order "such terms and conditions as in its 
judgment public convenience and necessity may require," 
and to do whatever is "necessary or convenient" in the ex-
ercise of such power. The legislature has not attempted to 
limit, qualify, or define the type of condition which may 
be imposed. Nor are we able to find any cases under a 
similar statute wherein a court has attempted to limit the 
nature of the condition, precedent or subsequent, which a 
commission may invoke. 
We submit that 76-4-24 and 76-4-1 contain definite and 
clear grants of power to the Commission to deal with the 
specific problem presented in the instant case. An analysis 
of the language of Section 24, supra, clearly shows that the 
procedure contemplated is that the Commission may issue 
a certificate and attach to the authority thereby granted 
terms and conditions whick it sees fit to impose. 
By virtue of the general power thus given, every 
order granting power or authority to a utility contains 
conditions implied by law which, if not adhered to, may 
subject the order to modification or revocation. Almost 
every order of the Commission contains express provisions 
or conditions subsequent to its granting which must be 
complied with by the applicant. These relate to filings of 
tariffs, policies of insurance, installation, maintenance and 
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operation of interlocking and other safety devices, evidence 
of the consummation of transactions authorized in acquisi-
tion cases, and compliance with required accounting prac-
tice and procedure. It is interesting in this regard to note 
that even in the cases cited by Appellant conditions subse-
quent were attached to the Commission order. Thus, in Re 
Wilcox, cited at page 21 of Appellant's brief P. U. R. 
1916 C, the Commission provided that the certificate 
granted would become null and void unless. construction 
was commenced not later than the first day of June and 
unless petitioners should have available all equipment and 
pipe necessary for the sale, manufacture and transportation 
of gas not later than the first day of October, 1917. 
Surely, in view of the language of the statute, a Court 
cannot properly hold that the imposing of a condition sub-
sequent invalidates a commission order. The only test of 
the validity of the order is not whether it is conditional but 
whether or not there is evidence to support it or whether 
it violates any constitutional rights of the Appellant or 
arbitrarily discriminates against the Appellant. Our stat-
utes and decisions dealing with the power of the Supreme 
Court to review decisions of the Public Service Commis-
sion so provide. 76-6-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, in 
its pertinent provisions is as follows: 
"* * * within thirty days after the rendi-
tion of the decision on rehearing, the applicant or 
any party to the proceeding deeming himself ag-
grieved * * * may apply to the Supreme Court 
for a writ of certiorari for the purpose of having the 
Ia wfulness of the original order or decision * * * 
inquired into and determined. * * * The review 
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shall not be extended further than to determine 
whether the commission has regularly pursued its 
authority including a determination of whether the 
order or decision under review violates any right of 
the petitioner under the constitution of the United 
States or of the State of Utah. The findings and 
conclusions of the commission on questions of fact 
shall be final and shall not be subject to review. 
Such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts 
and the findings and conclusions of the commission 
on reasonableness and discrimination." 
The legislature has thus limited the right of the Su-
preme Court to interfere with the judgment and discretion 
of the Public Service Commission to those cases wherein 
the Commission has failed to regularly pursue its authority 
or has violated a right of the appellant under the constitu-. 
tion of the United States or the State of Utah. The legis-
lature has further provided that findings of fact, includ-
ing findings and conclusions as to reasonableness and dis-
crimination, are final and not subject to review. 
Our Supreme Court in confining itself to the foregoing 
limited power of review has respected the legislature's ob-
vious intent and has interfered very little with the Public 
Service Commission's findings on facts, including its de-
termination of what is reasonable, or what is discrimina-
tory. 
In one of the first cases, Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co., et 
al. v. Public Utilities Com.mission, 63 Utah 392, 226 P. 
456, the Fuel Company brought an action before the Com-
mission against The Denver and Rio Grande Western Rail-
road Company seeking reparations on coal shipments. on 
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the grounds that the freight charged by the railroad was 
excessive both as a matter of reasonableness and as a mat-
ter of la\Y. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, In 
sustaining the Commission action, said: 
''It is important to keep in mind the provisions 
of our statute relating to that subject. Comp. Laws 
of Utah 1917, Section 4834, where the powers of 
this court to review the decisions of the commission 
are enumerated, provides:" (Citing 76-6-15, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, supra.) 
"Here, thus, is a clear, explicit and unambigu-
ous statement of both the power and the limits of 
that power. Beyond that ~ve cannot go." 
In Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company v. 
Public Utilities Commission of Utah, et al., which came 
pefore the Supreme Court on two occasions, and as two 
separate cases, 80 Utah 455, 15 P. (2d) 358 and 81 Utah 
286, 17 P. (2d) 287, there is some helpful language on the 
question now before this Court. The two decisions were 
written by Judge Wolfe, who at that time was a district 
court judge but who was sitting by invitation on the Su-
preme Court. The question in general was whether or not 
petitioner should be permitted to change its stations from 
an agency to non agency stations. Judge Wolfe in his first 
opinion said : 
"Technically stated, our power of review goes to 
the extent of determining whether there was any 
substantial evidence to support the decision of the 
commission. * * *" 
Petitioner, in its argument, had relied on certain New 
Mexico cases. The Judge pointed out that these decisions 
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were not helpful as the New Mexico Supreme Court had 
the power to review the reasonableness and lawfulness of 
an order made by the State Corporation Commission and 
was not bound by the findings of that commission. Judge 
Wolfe said: 
"* * * If the power of this court to review 
the proceedings and the evidence before the commis-
sion were the same as given to the Supreme Court 
. of New Mexico, we could review the evidence and 
determine whether in our opinion the commission's 
judgment was correct, and we could determine from 
the evidence itself, as if the question had been be-
fore this court for the first time, whether the ap-
plication of the railroad should not be granted. Un-
der the New Mexico procedure, the commission on 
appeal is considered analogous to a referee taking 
testimony and submitting recommendations. The 
court rnay or may not follow the recommendations; 
its judgment operates directly on the evidence and 
not on the decision of the commission. But we can-
not do that under the provisions of section 4834." 
(Italics ours.) 
The Judge pointed out that the right of the Court to 
review a Commission finding was similar to its right to 
review the finding of a jury. He said: 
"* * * A court must not set aside a verdict 
merely because it disagrees with the verdict, but 
orily if it is such that the court could say that no 
person in a reasonable state of mind, free from pas-
sion, bias, or prejudice, following the principles of 
law given it, could have so found under the evidence. 
This court must not determine whether its suppos-
edly reasonable minds differ from the minds of the 
commission in the exercise of their judging facul-
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ties, but 'vhether any reasonable mind could have 
agreed with the decision in view of the law and the 
evidence.~' (Italics ours.) 
Elaborating further on this same question, Judge 
'Volfe, in the second case, wrote : 
"* * * If there is any evidence upon which 
any reasonable judging mind could come to the same 
conclusion that the commission came to it would be 
our duty to affirm the decision of the comrruss1on. 
* * *" 
The Judge also paid his respects to the value of prece-
dents from other jurisdictions on the question of reasonable-
ness of the Commission action. He wrote in his first opin-
ion: 
"* * * Furthermore, since the commission 
has the duty to exercise its ovvn judgment on the 
facts, the opinion of no court on similar facts can 
be a precedent. * * *" 
This last statement is especially applicable to the au-
thorities cited by the Appellant from other jurisdictions, 
primarily those cited under Point (a) of Point 1 of Appel-
lant's brief. Thus, in Re Wilcox, P. U. R. 1916 C (Idaho), 
page 21 Appellant's brief, Re Achtenburg, 8 P. U. R. New 
Series 397 (Mo.), page 27 Appellant's brief, Re Grand 
Rapids Gas Light Co., 13 P. U. R. New Series 445 (Mich.), 
page 30 Appellant's brief, Re Tennessee Gas & Transpor-
tation Co., 40 P. U. R. ~Jew Series 129 (Tenn.), page 31 
Appellant's brief, and several Federal Power Commission 
cases, opinions of the respective tribunals are given re-
specting their judgments as to what is reasonable under 
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entirely different facts and circumstances than in the in-
stant case. Following the suggestion of Judge Wolfe, we 
submit that Appellant might as well cite the jury verdicts 
from other cases to prove that a jury verdict in a given 
situation is wrong. 
The foregoing decisions cannot be helpful unless they 
indicate that the action taken by the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah, in the case now before this Court, was 
not "regularly pursued" or that the order made violates 
some constitutional right of the Appellant or in some way 
is arbitrary and capricious. We do not find language 
which so indicates in the cases cited by Appellant. 
In the Wilcox case, supra, the dispute before the Idaho 
Public Service Commission was between two applicants 
who had filed within one month of each other seeking a 
certificate to serve Idaho Falls with manufactured gas. 
Both applicants appeared against the other in opposition. 
The Commission held a joint hearing and granted a certifi-
cate to one of the petitioners. This certificate, as herein 
indicated, had attached to it conditions subsequent which 
rendered the order null and void if the conditions were 
not complied with. True, the Commission did employ lan-
guage indicating that the unsuccessful applicant seemed 
to have no plan and was "purely a promoter." But how 
does this language in any way bear upon the issue in the 
instant case? There is no promotion involved in the case 
at bar; in fact, promotion of any type is. specifically en-
joined by the Commission's order. Furthermore, the fi-
nancial plan suggested by the Utah Natural Gas Company 
was endorsed as sound and feasible by Lehman Bros., one 
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of the outstanding banking houses in this country ; finally 
there is nothing in the language used indicating the Utah 
Commission is without authority to do what it did. 
In Re .4.chtenburg, supra, the applicant seeking a cer-
tificate consisted of a group of individuals, without cor-
porate form, who proposed tentatively and conditionally 
to obtain borrowed capital for the purchase of a defunct 
railroad and to sell preferred and common stock in a pro-
posed corporation to be later organized. It further pro-
posed to seek permission from the Missouri Commission to 
borrow funds from the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion or some other source to finance the purchase of the 
proposed property based on a mortgage on that property 
which it had not yet acquired. The Missouri Court felt the 
plan was too tentative to grant a tentative certificate. We 
can only agree, but query, wherein does this case bear upon 
the present issue? 
In Re Grand Rapids Gas Co., supra, a Michigan Com-
mission permitted an existing public utility operating on 
public financing to build a pipe line from a new field into 
the City of Grand Rapids. It appears from the evidence 
that there were not enough probable reserves in the new 
area to serve the city with 100% natural gas for a period 
of more than four years. However, the evidence showed 
that by mixing the natural gas with 50% artificial gas. the 
company could serve Grand Rapids for a period of about 
eight years. On the basis of this limited showing of re-
serves the appellant was permitted by the Michigan Com-
mission to build the line. Surely this case relied upon by 
Appellant does not support its apparent position that this 
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Respondent has failed to show adequate reserves. The im-
portant fact which Appellant apparently does not recog-
nize is that Respondent company is not claiming adequate 
reserves for an unconditional certificate. It is claiming 
an adequate showing to support the conditional order made. 
Some of the language used by the Michigan Commission 
is very applicable. Thus, at page 451 the Commission said: 
"* * * It must be kept in mind that the 
Grand Rapids Gas Light Company is a public Util-
ity and its funds can be expended only where the 
Commission finds that such expenditure is reason-
able and logical and will serve the public conven-
ience and necessity." 
The Utah Natural Gas Company does not propose to 
use public funds and is prevented from doing so by the 
Commission's conditional order. 
At page 462 of the opinion the Michigan Commission, 
in justifying the construction of the line on the basis of 
meager reserves, said : 
"* * * Opinions have been expressed that 
the building of a pipe line is not warranted except 
when a sufficient reserve is actually proven to sup-
ply the community to be served for a period of eight 
or ten years. This has not been and necessarily must 
not be a fixed rule, but depends on many conditiom. 
For example, the distance of the community from 
the field as relating to the construction investment, 
the possibilities of further discovery, the possibili-
ties for development of usage which diffe-rs greatly 
according to the type of community. * * *" (Ital-
ics ours.) 
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\Ve submit that the present order of the Utah Com-
mission, because of its conditional nature, is more conser-
vative than the unconditional order of the Michigan Com-
mission in the Grand Rapids case relied upon by Appellant. 
Furthermore, the Michigan Commission expressly disap-
proves the Appellant's fundamental contention that the 
Utah Commission has no jurisdiction to make a conditional 
order similar to the one made in the instant case. 
In Incorporators of Service Gas Company v. Public 
Service Commission of Pennsylvania, 126 Pa. Super. Ct. 
381, 190 A. 653, page 35 Appellant's brief, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court had before it for review a decision of the 
Pennsylvania Public Service Commission denying to peti-
tioners a certificate to serve natural gas in an area already 
adequately served by four existing gas companies. The 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania Sll;Stained the Commission's 
ruling and said at page 262 : 
"* * * The record discloses no inadequacy 
of service in the territories served by the respective 
protestants and included in appellant's application. 
There is no testimony upon which such a finding 
could be based; and, on the contrary, the testimony 
of appellants and the protesting companies was con-
sistently to the effect that they knew of no one in 
the territory in question who had demanded gas and 
was unable to secure it. * * *" 
Surely this case cannot be helpful in deciding the prob-
lems existing in the State of Utah. In this state we not 
only have an admitted inadequate service in the area served 
by the Mountain Fuel Supply Company, but there is a total 
lack of any service in most areas of the state. 
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In Re Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co. and Re North 
Dakota Consumers Gas Co., 30 P. U. R. (N. S.) 321, page 
34 of Appellant's brief, two applicants were seeking per-
mission to construct interstate ga.s lines from Kansas and 
Montana to certain specified towns, in eastern North Da-
kota and western Minnesota. The hearing was before the 
Federal Power Commission and was the first case to arise 
under the Federal Natural Gas Act Section 7(c) 15 U.S. 
C. A., sec. 717g. (c), which provided among other things 
the following: 
"* * * In passing on applications for cer-
tificates of convenience and necessity, the Commis-
sion shall give due consideration to the applicant's 
ability to render and maintain adequate service at 
rates lower than those prevailing in the territory to 
he served, it being the intention of Congress that 
natural gas shall be sold in interstate commerce for 
resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, 
commercial, industrial, or any other use at the lowest 
possible reasonable rate consistent with the main-
tenance of adequate service in the public interest." 
In discussing the Kansas company's application the 
Federal Power Commission pointed out that it did not 
appear from the evidence that the Kansas company had 
a firm commitment to purchase gas at the Hugotan Field 
in Kansas. The Commission therefore said at page 333: 
"* * * We could not issue an unconditional 
certificate of public convenience and necessity nor 
authorize the issuance of such an unconditional cer-
tificate until we had received assurance in the form 
of a contract satisfactory to us that the reserve of 
natural gas purportedly available to the Kansas 
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Company is actually available upon firm commit-
ment." (Italics ours.) 
It was interesting to observe that the Federal Power 
Commission retained jurisdiction of the two cases so that 
further evidence could be introduced. 
\Ve do not believe that cases decided before the Fed-
eral Power Commission involving inte!pretation of the 
Natural Gas Act and involving interstate transportation of 
natural gas can limit this Court in determining the power 
of the Public Service Commission of Utah to issue the con-
ditional order here in question. The Kansas and North 
Dakota cases are particularly inapp-licable inasmuch as the 
Federal Power Commission expressly stated that it could 
not issue an unconditional certificate in that case. We do 
not claim that the Utah Commission could properly issue 
an unconditional certificate in the instant case, nor did it 
do so. 
POINT II. 
THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE IS REA-
SONABLE AND IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST. 
It seems to us that the Commission's problem, funda-
mentally and simply stated, was as. follows: 
The evidence showed an admitted inadequate supply 
of natural gas in the State of Utah and a real public need 
to augment this inadequate supply. The possible sources 
of an additional supply were: 
1. The Mountain Fuel Supply Company. 
2. New Mexico reserves to be served by the Utah 
Pipe Line Company. 
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3. Utah reserves to be supplied by the Utah Natural 
Gas Company. 
From which of these sources did the Commission have 
the best possibility of obtaining additional gas? 
The Mountain Fuel Supply admitted that it would be 
unable to adequately serve the domestic and industrial needs 
of the northern part of the state now or in the foresee-
able future. 
The Utah Pipe Line Company had not obtained a cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity from the Federal 
Power Con1mission and it might not be able to do so. Until 
it obtained such a certificate there was no possibility of 
obtaining gas from that source. The obtaining of a certifi-
cate from the Federal Power Commission was and is prob-
lematical. In any event before such a certificate could be 
obtained, several years might elapse. Furthermore, New 
Mexico gas if brought into the State of Utah would either 
cause undeveloped Utah gas to remain in the ground or go 
to the Southern California market. 
Several private drillers. and producers with large hold-
ings of Utah acreage agreed to spend their own money 
developing Utah gas in the southeastern portion of the 
state and believed that they could prove up a sufficient 
supply 'vi thin a year to justify the construction of the line 
proposed by this Respondent, provided that the Commis-
sion would assure them by issuing a certificate that the 
intrastate line would be constructed if they were successful. 
Confronted 'vith these facts, the Commission appar-
ently determined that the best chance of obtaining more 
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natural gas was to accept the proposal made by the Utah 
Natural Gas Company and its sponsors. However, in order 
to protect the public, and to protect the Utah Pipe Line 
Co1npany, in the event it sincerely intended to make good 
its application before the Federal Power Commission, the 
Commission limited the Utah Natural Gas Company to one 
year, and in effect said: If you develop a sufficient proved 
supply from the estimated large reserves in the State of 
Utah within one year you may build the line as proposed 
and will be protected in doing so. If you do not, your con-
ditional rights will be void. In the meantime you may not 
make a public offering of stock. 
Surely such a decision is reasonable, and surely no one, 
not even the Appellant, can reasonably complain. If this 
Respondent is unable to comply with the conditions within 
a year's time, Appellant has not been hurt and the public 
will be greatly benefited. The only one who stands to lose 
if this Respondent fails, is this Respondent and private 
producers who desire to spend their own money. 
We submit that this Court, or any other reasonable 
body, faced with the problems which confronted the Public 
Service Con1mission of the State of Utah would have had 
no alternative but to issue the certificate as given. 
POINT III. 
THE APPELLANT IS NOT A PARTY AG-
GRIEVED BY THE ORDER HEREIN AP-
PEALED FROM. 
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We believe it is pertinent to point out that not only 
has Appellant no pipe line, facilities, customers or public 
duty within the State of Utah but that inasmuch as it pro-
poses to transport natural gas in interstate commerce, its 
power and authority to engage in any of its proposed func-
tions cannot in the first instance be granted or conferred 
by the Respondent, Public Service Commission of Utah, 
but must be granted, if at all, by the Federal Power Com-
mission, upon which body, by the Natural Gas Act of 1938 
[Chapter 15 (b), Title 15, U. S. C. A.] is conferred jur-
isdiction over the interstate transportation of natural gas. 
Appellant alleges that it has filed an application be-
fore the Federal Power Commission seeking authority to 
transport natural gas from the State of New Mexico into 
the State of Utah. Whether that application may be prose-
cuted or what the ultimate disposition of that proceeding 
may be is purely conjectural; but until and unless that 
application is prosecuted and the authority sought there-
under is granted, the Appellant, Utah Pipe Line Company, 
has at the most only a remote and contingent interest in 
the proceedings taken before the Public ~ervice Commis-
sion of Utah and in the order and decision from which it 
takes its appeal. 
There is no right on the part of any person, whether 
or not a party or participant in a proceeding before the 
Commission, to invoke the jurisdiction of this court. Such 
right is limited by statute to persons who are aggrieved 
by the order or decision complained of. The matter is 
controlled by Section 76-6-16, U. C. A. 1943,. wl1.ich pro-
vides in part as follows: 
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"Within thirty days after the application for a 
rehearing is denied, or, if the application is granted, 
within thirty days after the rendition of the decision 
on rehearing, the applicant or any party to the pro-
ceeding deeming himself aggrieved by such order 
or decision rendered upon rehearing may apply to 
the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari for the 
purpose of having the lawfulness of the original 
order or decision, or the order or decision on rehear-
ing, inquired into and determined." 
The question here presented, then, is whether the Ap-
pellant is a party aggrieved within the meaning of the above 
statute. It is elementary that only a person having a legal 
standing before this court enjoys the right to challenge the 
order or decision of an administrative body. The statutes 
of the several states and the United States are not uniform 
in defining who enjoys a legal standing before a court under 
such circumstances. Some statutes refer to persons en-
titled to challenge an administrative order as persons "ad-
versely affected", others refer to persons having "a legal 
standing", while some statutes employ the same language 
as that of our Code, limiting the right to persons "ag-
grieved". Regardless of the language employed, however, 
the principles controlling the right of challenge are essen-
tially uniform in the decisions of the courts of the various 
states and of the United States. 
The general rule as developd in the decision on this 
question seems to be this: In order for a party to be en-
tited to challenge a decision of an administrative body, 
the order or decision complained of must have an immed-
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iate, direct and material effect upon the then existing 
rights or property of the complaining party. 
The right of a party to challenge a decision of an ad-
ministrative body has so often been considered by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in connection with 
orders and decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion and other regulatory bodies that we believe the de-
cisions of that Court will be particularly helpful to this 
Court in considering the problem here presented. We there-
fore direct the attention of the Court to certain of those 
decisions. Perhaps the leading case in the field is Federal 
Pow-er Commission, et al. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 64 S. 
Ct. 281. In that decision the Rochester Telephone Cor-
poration case, infra, was referred to in connection with 
the power of a party to challenge an order or decision of 
any regulatory body, and the court, in connection with the 
power of the Federal Power Commission, at page 295 said 
in part: 
"The Court recently summarized the various 
types of administrative action or determination re-
viewable as orders under the Urgent Deficiencies 
Act of October 22, 1913, 28 U. S. C. Sees. 45, 47a, 
28 U. S. C. A. Sees. 45, 4 7 a, and kindred statutory 
provisions. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 
307 U. S. 125, 59 S. Ct. 754, 83 L. Ed. 1147. It was 
there pointed out that where 'the order sought to be 
reviewed does not of itself adversely affect com-
plainant but only affects his rights adversely on the 
contingency of future administrative action', it is 
not reviewable. * * * The Court said, 'In view 
of traditional conceptions of federal judicial power. 
resort to the courts in these situations is either pre-
mature or wholly beyond their province.'" 
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In ]}Joffat Tunnel League, et ol. v. United States, 53 
S. Ct. 543, an action was brought by Moffat Tunnel League 
against the United States and others to set aside an order 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In affirming a 
decree dismissing the petition the Court, at page 545, said: 
"* * * the complaint must show that plain-
tiff has, or represents others having, a legal right 
or interest that will be injuriously affected by the 
order. (Citing among other cases Edward Hines 
Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, 44 S. Ct. 72.) 
Plaintiffs have failed to show that they are so qual-
ified." 
In RochesteT Telephone Corporation v. United States, 
59 S. Ct. 754, suit was brought in equity by the Telephone 
Corporation against the United States and the Federal 
Communications CQmmission to review an order of that 
Commission. The bill was dismissed by the lower court 
and dismissal affirmed on appeal in the Supreme Court. 
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for that court, reviews the 
circumstances under which an order of an administrative 
body may be reviewed or attacked by a party deeming 
himself aggrieved. 
In L. Singer & Sons, et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, 61 S. Ct. 254, the court had occasion to affirm 
the order of the Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing a 
complaint. The facts in this case were that the complain-
ants were con1mission merchants doing business in one 
city who would be adversely affected by the construction 
into another city of a railroad extension involved in the 
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case. The Supreme Court at page 257 quotes from the 
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals as follows: 
"The plaintiffs have no definite legal right 
which is threatened. They are, however, persons 
whose welfare may be adversely affected by the 
bringing about of a material change in the trans-
portation situation, in the sense that the extension 
proposed by the defendant, if built and operated, 
will enable a competitive market to function to their 
detriment. In that sense, we think it may safely be 
said that the proposed extension of defendant's lines 
may adversely affect the plaintiffs' we1fare. We are 
of the opinion, however, that their complaint dis-
closes that their welfare cannot be directly, but only 
indirectly and consequentially, affected by the pro-
posed extension. They are not in competition with 
the defendant. They are not engaged in the trans-
portation business. Their only peculiar interest in 
that business is in the effect which changes in it may 
have upon the market where they do business and 
upon rival markets now or hereafter established in 
the territory which the plaintiffs serve. * * * 
We conclude that the statute is not to be so liberally 
construed as to enable those who fear adverse effects 
upon their business from the establishment of com-
petitive enterprises requiring transportation facili-
ties to maintain suits to enjoin railroads from con-
structing what are claimed to be unauthorized ex-
tensions to serve such enterprises." 
The Court finally, at page 258, concludes as follows: 
"* * * a suit cannot be instituted by an 
individual unless he 'possesses something more than 
a common concern for obedience to law.' The gen-
eral or common interest finds protection in the per-
mission to sue granted to public authorities. An 
individual may have some special and peculiar in-
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terest \vhich may be directly and materially affected 
by alleged unlawful action. See Detroit & M. Ry. v. 
Boyne City, etc., Co., D. C. 286 F. 5-10. If such cir-
cumstances are shown he may sue ; he is then 'party 
in interest' within the meaning of the statute. In 
the absence of these circumstances he is not such a 
party." 
In Alabama Po~ver Co. v. I ekes, et al., 58 S. Ct. 300, 
the Power Company sought to enjoin Ickes as Federal 
Emergency Administrator of Public Works and others from 
the execution of certain loan-and-grant agreements entered 
into with municipalities. The Court, in stating the conten-
tion of the petitioner, at page 302 said: 
"The injury which petitioner will suffer, it is 
contended, is the loss of its business as a result of 
the use of the loans and grants by the municipalities 
in setting up and maintaining rival and competing 
plants; a result, it is further contended, which will 
be directly caused by the unlawful act of the admin-
istrator in making and consummating the loan-and-
grant agreements." 
In stating its conclusion on the same page, the court said: 
"On appeal to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, that court found 
it unnecessary to consider the validity of the loans 
and grants, and affirmed the decrees of the District 
Court dismissing the bills on the ground that no 
legal or equitable right of the power company had 
been invaded, and the company, therefore, was with-
out standing to challenge the validity of the admin-
istrator's acts. 91 F. 2d 303. With that view we 
agree, and confine our consideration of the cases ac-
cordingly." 
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'resting the position of the Appellant here in the light 
of the rules laid down in the foregoing cases, it appears 
clear that it is not a party aggrieved within the meaning 
of our statute. The Appellant stands in the position of a 
party asserting only an expectancy to engage in a com-
petitive enterprise. Appellant enjoys a complete freedom 
of election to change or abandon any intended plan or 
enterprise at any time for it is neither under the jurisdic-
tion or control of the Respondent Commission nor any 
other commission. It has within the State of Utah no prop-
erty, customers, investments or market to protect. It owes 
no duty of public service to anyone. A clearer case for 
invoking the principles announced in the foregoing deci-
sions could hardly be found. 
In Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Federal Power 
Commission et al., 113 F. (2d) 281, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reviewed the decision of the Federal 
Power Commission granting to the Louisiana Nevada Tran-
sit Company a certificate of convenience and necessity 
under the Natural Gas Act. The Appellant claimed that 
there was not a proper showing of public convenience and 
necessity and that the order contained conditions as to 
rates which were beyond the power of the Federal Power 
Commission to impose. The Circuit Court in sustaining 
the decision of the Federal Power Commission said at 
page 283: 
"* * * Finally, we find nothing in the stat-
ute which prevents the commission from imposing 
in the interest of the public to be served by the 
construction, reasonable conditions upon the grant-
ing of a certificate of convenience and necessity, 
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and we cannot ag·ree with petitioner that their im-
position in any manner effects or impairs the cer-
tificate. 
"But, if we could abstractly agree, this would 
not avail petitioner, for it is aggrieved, not by the 
in1posed conditions, but by the granting of the per-
mit and under the statute, it may complain here 
only of an order by which it is aggrieved." 
It appears to us that this language is especially ap-
plicable to Appellant's position before this Court. The con-
ditions imposed restrict the ... L\.ppellant, not the Respondent 
company. They are in effect for Appellant's protection as 
well as for the protection of the general public. What Ap-
pellant is in reality objecting to is that this Respondent, 
during the period of the conditional order, will have an 
opportunity to deliver sufficient proven reserves to com-
mence the construction of the proposed gas line. If this 
Respondent fails to do so because of the conditions imposed, 
Appellant will have no cause to complain and can pursue 
its application before the Federal Power Commission. 
POINT IV. 
THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE BY THE 
COMMISSION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE OF T·HE F'EDERAL OR 
STATE CONSTITUTION AND DOES NOT CON-
STITUTE AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF 
POWER TO AN UNNAl\iED GEOLOGIST AND 
DOES NOT PERMIT A FINDING ON A MA-
TERIAL FACT BASED SOLELY ON HEAR-
SAY EVIDENCE. 
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The Appellant throughout its brief continually asserts 
that the Commission found there were inadequate reserves 
in Southeastern Utah to justify the construction of the 
proposed line. This is not true. At page 1210 of the rec-
ord the Commission made the following finding: 
"The Commission further finds that the esti-
mated reserves in the area where the applicant has 
gas purchase contracts are sufficient, if prov,ed, to 
make the construction of applicant's pipe line and 
facilities economically feasible." (Italics ours.) 
The term "proved" refers to a sufficient development 
of "blocked out" available gas at the surface. The Com-
mission in effect gave the Respondent Utah Natural Gas 
Company one year to develop from the adequate reserves 
such a proven available amount to justify the financing 
and immediate construction of the line. The Commission 
said: 
"* * * The Commission further concludes, 
however, that conditions should be imposed upon 
such authority so granted requiring that within 
one year from the date the order granting such cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity shall be effec-
tive said Utah Natural Gas Company shall 
* * * * * 
"(b) Concurrently with the furnishing 
of such commitment and as a part thereof, Utah 
Natural Gas Company shall file with this Com-
mission the certificate of an independent geolo-
gist of recognized professional standing, accep-
table to this Commission, that there are proven 
gas reserves committed to Utah Natural Gas 
Company adequate to justify the construction 
of the line and facilities; * * *" 
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In the event the Utah Natural Gas Company does not 
file with the Commission the certificate required the condi-
tional rights issued shall become null and void. In the event 
the Respondent does file such certificate any party to the 
proceeding, including, of course, the Appellant, 'viii have 
an opportunity to be heard and to cross-examine. If there 
can be any question about the Commission's intention it is 
fully explained and clarified by Commission's counsel in 
his brief at page 16 wherein he states: 
"It is contended by the Petitioner that the Pub-
lic Service Commission of Utah in the Certificate 
of Convenience and Necessity issued on March 12, 
1951 delegated to a geologist the power of the Com-
mission to make a finding as to the adequacy of the 
gas supply of Utah Natural Gas Company. This, the 
Commission did not intend to do and does not be-
lieve that it did do. 
"In order to determine whether or not there is 
an adequate supply of gas it is, of course, necessary 
for the Commission to lean very heavily upon the tes-
timony of expert witnesses on this subject. The Com-
mission has listened to experts produced by Utah 
Natural Gas Company, by Utah Pipe Line Company 
and other interested parties and reserves the right to 
make its own investigation to aid it to determine 
this fact. If the language of the Commission order 
is subject to the interpretation placed thereupon by 
Petitioner, it certainly carries a meaning not in-
tended by the Commission and for the inaptness of 
the language, if such exists, counsel takes full re-
sponsibility. Upon the expiration of the one year 
period granted in the certificate in which the appli-
cant, Utah 1-Jatural Gas Company, may present evi-
dence that it has an adequate supply of gas and 
adequate financing available it is the intention of 
the Public Service Commission of Utah to again set 
the matter down for hearing. All interested parties 
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will be given notice and will be given an opportunity 
to appear. The burden of proof will be upon the 
applicant, Utah Natural Gas Company to prove to 
the satisfaction of the Commission that an adequate 
supply of gas is available. This proof, of course, 
must come in the form of testimony by competent 
witnesses. The petitioner in this case, as well as all 
other protestants, will be given an opportunity to 
controvert this evidence if they feel that it is not 
reliable. However, the Commission felt that before 
it should proceed with any such hearing the appli-
cant, Utah Natural Gas Company, should first fur-
nish the Commission with documentary evidence 
which would establish prima facie that the require-
ments of the certificate had been met. It was not 
and is not the intention of the Commission to dele-
gate any of its powers. When the necessary evidence 
is in as to whether or not the conditions of the cer-
tificate have been met, the Commission will then 
consider this additional evidence and on the basis of 
that evidence will reach its own findings as to 
whether or not Utah Natural Gas Company has 
complied with the orders of the Commission and is 
entitled to have its certificate made unconditional." 
If the Commission's intention needed any clarification, 
the foregoing should be sufficient. But even should this 
Court presume that the Con1mission intended to deny Ap-
pellant a right to be heard on the question of "proven re-
serves", and intended to delegate to an "unknown geologist" 
the Commission's duty to finally determine an ultimate 
fact, it has not yet done so. Until it does so, Appellant has 
not been imposed upon and therefore makes a premature 
objection. 
If Utah Natural Gas Company is unable to file its 
certificate, Appellant will be content and Respondent's 
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rights will terminate. If it does file the certificate the 
Commission will then be obliged to proceed. If it does so 
improperly Appellant can then object. Until that time the 
question is moot. 
POINT V. 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT T·HE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURAL RE-
SOURCES OF THE STATE IS DESIRABLE IS 
A PROPER FINDING AND IS NOT ONE 
WHICH INDICATES l~ .. FAILURE TO REGU-
LARLY PURSUE ITS STATUTORY AUTHOR-
ITY. 
The Appellant urges under Point H of its brief, at 
page 132, that the Commission did not regularly pursue 
its statutory authority, because by deciding that the de-
velopment of Utah natural resources was desirable it there-
by constituted itself "a development and conservation com-
mission." This, the Appellant asserts, it had no authority 
to do and therefore its ultra vires finding makes its con-
ditional order void. 
Appellant's conclusion is allegedly supported by several 
cited cases. We desire to state the fact situations in these 
cases so that this Court may see for itself the extent to 
which Appellant has gone in its endeavor to make a point. 
The only Utah case cited is In Re Clays, 1924-E P. 
U. R. 178, page 136 of Appellant's brief. In that case ap-
plicant sought a certificate of convenience and necessity 
to build an ore tramway from Alta to Wasatch in Little 
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Cottonwood C·anyon. The Utah Public Service Commission, 
after reviewing the testimony, said at page 188: 
"Under all the circumstances and facts shown 
to exist, we are of the opinion that this case does 
not come within the provisions of the section of the 
act authorizing the Commission to issue a certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity before the tram-
way is constructed, and that the Commission has no 
jurisdiction to- authorize or deny the c·onstruction 
of the tramway." (Italics ours.) 
There is not a word in the case applicable to Appel-
lant's contention. 
In N ortkwest Businessmen's Association v. Illinois 
Commission, 168 N. E. 890, page 136 of Appellant's brief, 
the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Commerce 
Commission of Illinois could not rescind a prior order made 
without making findings of fact different from the find-
ings made in support of the original order, either on the 
grounds that the original findings were erroneous or that 
the facts had changed. The Illinois Supreme Court held 
that the Commission, without doing this, could not change 
its original order simply on a policy basis. 
In State Ex Rel. Thatcher v. Boyle, et al., 204 P. 378, 
at page 137 of Appellant's brief, the Appellant quotes the 
syllabus to the effect that administrative tribunals are 
creatures of statute, which fact no one can deny. The only 
point cited in the Thatcher case was whether the Montana 
Public Service Commission was authorized by its enabling 
statute to regulate, as a public utility, irrigation compan· 
ies. The enabling statute included "water for business". 
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The Montana Court properly, we think, held that the irri-
gation company could not be regulated as a public utility 
under such a statute. 
In Backus-Brooks Company v. Northern Pacific Rail-
road Compa.ny, et al., 21 F. (2d) 4, page 137 of Appellant's 
brief, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the federal 
district court was without jurisdiction to fix joint rates 
because the preliminary question of what constituted a just 
and proper rate had not been determined by the proper 
commissions, to wit, the Interstate Commerce Commission 
and the State Commission of Minnesota, and that therefore 
the district court was without jurisdiction to award dam-
ages to a stockholder on account of a division of these joint 
rates. As a part of this decision the Circuit Court held 
that the Commission of Minnesota by reason of the broad 
legislative language which conferred powers on it was 
able to fix and establish joint rates. In reasoning to this 
conclusion, the court by way of dicta stated the general 
proposition that commissions created by statute can exer-
cise only those powers which are delegated to it. Surely 
this is not debatable. 
In Re Montana Dakota Po~ver Company, P. U. R. 1929-
A 369, page 134 of Appellant's brief, several applicants 
sought certificates to construct an electric transmission 
line within the state in an area already b.eing served. The 
main object of the transmission line, so far as the applicant 
t Scranton Electric was concerned, appeared to be to pro-
~ vide a possible market for slack coal which was to be used 
:~ as generating fuel, and so to build up that mining.property. 
~ It appeared, however, from the testimony as found by the 
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Commission, that "the proposed transmission line and local 
plants are incidental to the coal mining industry." It thus 
appears that the case in reality shows that the North Da-
kota Board considered the very policy question which the 
Appellant claims could nof properly be determined. 
We respectfully submit that the generalities, dicta and 
contrary rulings in the foregoing cases not only fail to 
support Appellant's point, they actually argue against it. 
The powers given to the Public Service Commission of the 
State of Utah are extremely broad. In 76-4-1, supra, the 
Commission is given "power and jurisdiction to supervise 
and regulate every public utility in this state, and to do 
all things, whether herein specifically designated or not, 
in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in 
the exercise and power of such jurisdiction." We submit 
that from this general grant alone the Commission was 
am ply justified in finding that the development of natural 
resources of the state is desirable. 
But even should we assume for the purpose of argu-
ment that the Commission's so called "policy finding" in 
this regard, constitutes a finding which was beyond the 
Commission's delegated power, is it conceivable that such 
a finding, which is undisputably in the best interests of the 
state, will invalidate the Commission's. order? We submit 
that taking Appellant's argument at its best the conclusion 
reached is not only unsupported by authorities, but it is in 
its fundamental aspects erroneous. Furthermore, it is ap· 
parent from a reading of the Report and Order made that 
the Commission's finding of convenience and necessity was 
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not solely based on this so called policy finding but was 
based on many other facts therein stated. 
POINT VI. 
THE COl\ilVIISSION DID NOT EXCEED ITS 
L~.\ WFUL AUTHORITY IN HEARING THE AP-
PLICATION OF THE UTAH NAT'URAL GAS 
COMPANY BEFORE IT HEARD THE APPLI-
CATION OF APPELLANT. 
Under Point I of Appellant's brief, page 139, Appel-
lant contends that because the Public Service Commission 
of Utah heard the Respondent Utah Natural Gas Company's 
application first, without hearing Appellant's application, 
it proceeded unlawfully. In support of this proposition 
Appellant cites several cases wherein it is generally stated 
that "priority in the field does not of itself govern the 
granting of a certificate." 
\Ve will not cite cases to challenge this proposition, al-
though we do point out that there are many cases which 
also support holdings that "the applicant who first files 
an application for a certificate of convenience and neces-
sity should receive an award due his diligence." (See cases 
cited in P. U. R. Digest, Vol. 1, Section 95). Undoubtedly 
both of the foregoing generalizations correctly state the 
law. 
In the instant case the Commission received an appli-
cation from the Respondent Utah Natural Gas Company 
on May 29, 1950 (R. 1106). An amended application was 
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filed on November 17, 1950 (R. 1111). Notice of hearing 
was given on the 21st day of November, 1950. This notice 
was published as required by law. On December 11, 1950, 
the case came on for hearing in the Governor's board room 
at the Capitol Building. The room was filled with inter-
ested parties. Some of them appeared to either object to 
or support Respondent's application (R. 1, 2, 6, 7). At 
that time Respondent Utah Natural Gas Company appeared 
with all its witnesses. Most of them were from out of the 
state. Notwithstanding these facts the Appellant on this 
morning, for the first time, entered an appearance and in-
dicated that it had an interest in the proceeding. 
The facts show that two days before this appearance 
it had been incorporated and presumably had filed an ap-
plication before the Federal Power Commission. .on the 
morning of its appear·ance Appellant had not filed an ap-
plication for an intrastate certificate before the Utah Com-
mission and did not file such application until more than 
six W·eeks later, and after Respondent Utah Natural Gas 
Company had presented its evidence. (Appellant~s brief, 
page 150.) 
The Respondent Utah Natural Gas Company objected 
to Appellant's appearance as a party in intervention and 
the Commission, after considering the matter, overruled 
the objection and permitted Appellant to appear for the 
limited purpose of objecting to the application of the Utah 
Natural Gas Company. 
More than six weeks after the first hearing date on 
Respondent's application Appellant filed for the first time 
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its application before the Utah Public Service Commission 
seeking an intrastate certificate to construct its proposed 
pipe line (Appellant's brief, page 150). 
On this showing Appellant claims the Utah Public 
Service Commission erred in proceeding with Respondent's 
application without hearing Appellant's application first. 
We submit that such a contention is so unreasonable that 
it does not merit a serious answer. Does the Appellant 
seriously contend that the Public Service Commission of 
Utah should delay a matter which has already been set, 
with witnesses present and all present, except Appellant, 
ready to proceed, until Appellant files its application and 
prepares a case? Suppose the Commission had been so in ... 
dulgent; what would have been accomplished? Until Ap-
pellant receives a certificate of convenience and necessity 
from the Federal Power Commission, any action taken by 
the Public Service Commission of Utah would not only be 
premature, it would be moot. Furthermore, had the Com-
mission delayed the hearing or decision on Respondent's 
application until such time as the Federal Power Commis-
sion had determined whether or not Appellant should re-
ceive an interstate certificate of convenience and necessity, 
the matter would still be in abeyance and in all probability 
would remain in abeyance for several years to come. For 
these reasons, as well as for many others that may appear, 
we submit that the Commission would have acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously if it had delayed the matter as 
suggested by Appellant in its brief. 
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POINT VII. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY AND 
CAPRICIOUSLY IN NOT HAVING A FULL 
JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE FEDERAL 
POWER COMMISSION BEFORE RULING ON 
RESPONDENT''S APPLICATION. 
In Point K under Proposition IV of Appellant's. brief, 
page 162, Appellant contends that it was the duty of the 
Utah Commission to obtain a joint hearing of the entire 
case. To support this strange conclusion it cites 1.37 (c) 
of the Federal Power Commission Rules and Regulations, 
and states that on December 21, 1950, the Federal Power 
Commission wrote a letter to the Public Service Commis-
sion of Utah inquiring whether or not the latter desired 
a joint hearing. 
We, of course, are unable to determine from the record 
whether the foregoing allegations are so. We assume that 
the Federal Power Commission rule is correctly stated, 
but we are entirely uninformed as to the contents of any 
letter which the Federal Power Commission did, or did 
not, send to the Utah Commission. Furthermore, we do 
not know whether or not the Utah Commission answered 
such letter, and if so what conclusions were reached. So 
far as we know the Federal Power Commission and the 
Utah Commission may have consulted together and reached 
some tentative conclusion relative to the entire matter. In 
any event, all these matters are outside the record and we 
do not propose to engage in profitless argument about 
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things which may or may not exist, and which in any event 
are not properly before this Court. 
If we assume that the off the record assertions of 
Appellant are so, the conclusion which it urges does not 
follow. It would be a strangely unique development in the 
law if the decisions of State Commissions on intrastate 
affairs were controlled by the rules and regulations of the 
Federal Power Commission. We submit that when, and 
if, the Utah Pipe Line Company, Appellant herein, com-
pletes its application and has a hearing before the Federal 
Power Commission the rules and regulations of that body 
will become applicable. Until then we assume that the 
Utah law and the judgment of the Utah Commission will 
control. 
Appellant in its argument under Point K has erroneously, 
we believe, twisted the meaning of the Federal Statutes 
and rules enacted pursuant thereto, and has placed on the 
Utah Commission an authorization which in fact is placed 
upon the Federal Power Commission. Title 15, Sec. 717p. 
of the Natural Gas Act provides : 
"(a) The Commission may refer any matter 
arising in the administration of this chapter to a 
board to be composed of a member or members, as 
determined by the Commission, from the State or 
each of the States affected or to be affected by such 
matter. Any such board shall be vested with the 
same power and be subject to the same duties and 
liabilities as in the case of a member of the Com-
mission when designated by the Commission to hold 
any hearings. The action of such board shall have 
force and effect and its proceedings shall be con-
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ducted in such manner as the Commission shall by 
regulations prescribe." 
It would thus seem that the Federal Power Commis-
sion, and not the Public S.ervice Commission of Utah, is 
the body authorized by statute to provide for joint hearings. 
Perhaps when Appellant completes the preliminary mat-
ters necessary to confer jurisdiction and complies with the 
Federal Power Commission requirements that Commission 
will provide for a joint hearing. Until it does so the Ap-
pellant should not place that responsibility upon the Public 
Service Commission of Utah. 
There are many problems, outside the record, relating 
to Appellant's application before the Federal Power Com-
mission, which Appellant realizes even more than this 
Respondent. It will serve no useful purpose to discuss them 
herein. This case must be decided on this record. 
In subheading J of Proposition IV of Appellant's brief, 
pages 147, 161, Appellant argues that failure to provide a 
joint hearing, either before the Federal Power Commission 
or the Utah Commission was arbitrary and capricious for 
a further reason; it did not afford Appellant an oppor-
tunity to show that it could supply natural gas more cheaply 
than the Respondent. 
We have attempted to answer this argument herein, 
and also under Point VI, supra. We wish to add, however, 
that while Appellant continually assumes that its appli-
cation and Respondent's application are fundamentally the 
same, this is untrue. One application is intrastate and 
the other is interstate. Furthermore, Respondent proposes 
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to serve a large portion of the state which is entirely un ... 
covered by Appellant's application. This more extensive 
service of necessity means that Respondent's venture will 
cost more to construct and maintain. Therefore, the rela-
tive over all costs are not c;omparable. The length of the 
proposed lines, the size of the pipe, the location of the line, 
the gathering facilities, the area to be served, and the ca-
pacity of the two systems; all differ materially. The ulti-
mate cost to the consumer cannot be definitely determined 
at this stage of the proceedings. This fact was frankly 
admitted by Respondent during the course of the hearing, 
and is apparently conceded by Appellant who in its appli-
cation states approximate costs only. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Commission found that public convenience 
and necessity require the furnishing of additional natural 
gas to the Utah industrial area. The demand for natural 
gas in this area is such that if an assured adequate supply 
is available within the State of Utah no real problem of 
engineering, economics or financing is presented in con-
nection with the construction of the line. 
So insistent is the public demand for this additional 
gas supply that the Utah Commission concluded that this 
public need was paramount to the detriment or disadvan-
tage which might be sustained by protestants Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company, the mine operators who are pro-
ducing, the railroads which are transporting and the miners 
who are mining, coal. Each of these protestants was a real 
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party in interest. Each had a vital present and actual in-
terest in the proposal of Utah Natural Gas Company and 
each would be a party who might be aggrieved by the 
order of the Commission. Yet none of these parties is here 
objecting to the Commission's order. 
The Appellant, on the other hand, neither owns, con-
trols or relies upon any reserves of gas in the State of Utah. 
It has no property whatever in this state. It has no custo-
mers, no public duty or responsibility of any kind in this 
jurisdiction. The Utah Commission has no control what-
ever over Appellant; its application before that body could 
be withdrawn tomorrow. Stated in the most favorable 
light, the Appellant has at most only an expectancy that 
it may, at some indefinite future date, bring gas into Utah 
from another state. We believe it clear that Appellant is 
not a party aggrieved by the order of the Utah Commission 
within the meaning of our statute. 
Appellant seeks to set aside and annul the Commis-
sion's order upon numerous grounds, some of which, such 
as the claim that it did not receive sufficient notice of the 
hearing, are so lacking in merit that we have not extended 
this brief to dwell upon them. Primarily, the attack of the 
Appellant seems to be directed at the restrictions and con-
ditions which the Commission imposed upon the Respon-
dent. 
But the onus of these conditions fell not upon the 
Appellant but rather upon the Respondent, Utah Natural 
Gas Company. They were designed to give the Commission 
a continuing control over the proceeding in the- interest 
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of the public. As we have pointed out, inasmuch as these 
restrictions and conditions fell upon the Respondent, it, 
and not the Appellant, would have the right to complain 
of the impositions. 
To us the imposition of these conditions demonstrates 
a careful, considered and judicious attitude on the part of 
the Utah Commission. We suppose that the Appellant would 
have had the Utah Commission, instead of imposing con-
ditions as it did and thereby keeping control of the pro-
ceedings, shut the door completely upon the Respondent, 
thereby denying to those upon whom Respondent relies for 
its gas supply, the opportunity to spend their own money 
in exploration to gain assurance that if successful they 
could bring their developed gas to market in a friendly 
line. 
Had the Commission, in the face of the record in this 
proceeding, completely closed the door to the Respondent, 
we believe such an order would have been arbitrary and 
capricious. Instead, the Utah Commission in effect said 
to the Respondent: "You have told us that you have avail-
able gas to supply the public convenience and necessity 
of the industrial area of this state. The reserves on which 
you rely have not yet been developed. You may have one 
year in which your supporters, by spending their O"\Vn 
money in exploration, can back up the opinion of their 
geologists. If you succeed in developing the necessary gas 
supply, you may go forward with your enterprise. If you 
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fail, the door is closed upon your proposal." What could 
be more reasonable than this? 
The order should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLIFF'ORD L. ASHTON, 
S. N. CORNWALL, 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Utah Natural Gas Company. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
